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Abstract 
The Interstage Element of the Ares V launch vehicle was sized using a commercially 
available structural sizing software tool.  Two different concepts were considered, a metallic 
design and a composite design.  Both concepts were sized using similar levels of analysis 
fidelity and included the influence of design details on each concept. Additionally, the impact 
of the different manufacturing techniques and failure mechanisms for composite and 
metallic construction were considered.  Significant details were included in analysis models 
of each concept, including penetrations for human access, joint connections, as well as 
secondary loading effects.  The designs and results of the analysis were used to determine 
lifecycle cost estimates for the two Interstage designs.  Lifecycle cost estimates were based on 
industry provided cost data for similar launch vehicle components.  The results indicated 
that significant mass as well as cost savings are attainable for the chosen composite concept 
as compared with a metallic option. 
Nomenclature 
Al-Li = Aluminum-Lithium Alloy 2195 
DDT&E = Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
EDS = Earth Departure Stage 
HLLV  = Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle  
IMLEO = Injected Mass to LEO 
KSC = Kennedy Space Center 
LaRC = Langley Research Center 
LEO = Low Earth Orbit 
MSFC = Marshall Space Flight Center 
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
OHC = Open Hole Compression 
RCS = Reaction Control System 
                                                          
†
 Senior Structural Analyst, Structural and Thermal Systems Branch, MS/431, AIAA Senior Member. 
‡
 Deputy Manager, Ares Project Office, MS/208, AIAA Associate Fellow. 
§
 Senior Structural Analyst, Durability, Damage Tolerance, and Reliability Branch, MS/188E. 
**
 Senior Structural Analyst, Durability, Damage Tolerance, and Reliability Branch, MS/188E, AIAA Senior 
Member. 
††
 Senior Project Engineer (AMA, Inc.), Structural and Thermal Systems Branch, MS/431. 
‡‡
 Senior Cost Analyst, Systems Management Office, MS/020 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20120008842 2019-08-30T20:28:10+00:00Z
  
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
2 
I. Introduction 
HE National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is currently investigating long duration manned 
missions outside low earth orbit (LEO).  These missions are anticipated to require significantly larger launch 
vehicles than are currently available (commercially or otherwise).  Significant development efforts have taken place 
to date, and include sizing components from representative launch vehicles necessary for these missions.  While 
these efforts have demonstrated the potential for composite structures to decrease the mass of such a launch vehicle, 
it is important to consider the costs associated with the two primary material selection options: metallic and 
composite.  In order to compare the manufacturing and fabrication techniques appropriately for these two material 
options, a segment of a representative launch vehicle was evaluated using composite materials and metallic 
materials.  The costs associated with manufacturing technology development, production, insight/oversight, and 
unrealized mass benefits were then calculated and compared. The present paper sets the stage for a lifecycle cost 
comparison between metallic and composite manufacturing and fabrication methods by evaluating two competing 
Interstage designs, with a further objective to determine the manufacturing and fabrication method that results in the 
design with the least mass.  These baseline representations are then used to calculate lifecycle costs.  In this paper, 
the composite and metallic design concepts are compared using mass, technology and manufacturing development 
costs, and recurring costs. 
II. Ares V Background 
The Ares V launch vehicle was originally conceived as the heavy-lift component of the Ares launch vehicles for 
missions to the moon as well as alternate destinations.  Ares V was designed to be approximately 360 feet tall and 
weigh 7.4 million pounds at launch while delivering more than 220,000 pounds of cargo to LEO
1
.  The Ares V, 
shown in Fig. 1, consists of a shuttle-derived first stage with two attached solid rocket motors.  The upper stages (the 
Earth Departure Stage (EDS) and the Shroud) are connected to the first stage through the Interstage element, sized 
and evaluated in this study. 
While several design reference missions were considered through the life of the Ares V Project, the EDS 
generally was expected to separate from the vehicle at an altitude of approximately 450,000 feet at a speed of Mach 
8.8
1
.  As a result, the Interstage would be required to transfer loads from the payload Shroud and payload to the first 
stage structures during launch and ascent. 
T 
 
Figure 1. Ares V Conceptual Design. 
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The Constellation Program that included Ares V was canceled in October of 2010.  However, the future vision of 
NASA includes destinations for manned and unmanned exploration that will likely require launch vehicles of similar 
magnitude to Ares V.  The analysis included in this paper will still be relevant for dry structures subject to similar 
loading conditions and environments.  When comparing metallic and composite concepts the trends have shown 
consistency through multiple design cycles. These trends are anticipated to remain similarly consistent when 
considering different launch vehicles of this magnitude. 
 
III. Analysis Ground Rules and Assumptions 
Two Interstage designs were evaluated in this study: a 
metallic (aluminum-lithium 2195 alloy [Al-Li]) hat 
stiffened design and a composite sandwich design that 
utilized IM7/8552 carbon-epoxy facesheets and a Hexcel 
aluminum honeycomb core.  The analysis was intended to 
provide minimum mass results for both concepts despite the 
different analysis and manufacturing and fabrication 
methods.  Where possible, the requirements and 
assumptions were held constant between the two designs 
for a fair comparison of the results. 
A. Buckling and Crippling 
Shell buckling knockdown factors for the two designs were consistent with Ref. 3.  Crippling and crippling-
buckling interaction were considered failure mechanisms only for the metallic structures because the material can 
yield; this wasn’t an option for the composite structures considered herein. 
B. Material Geometric Constraints 
The minimum gage for the Al-Li material was 0.06 in. while the composite minimum gage was limited to 8 plies 
with a minimum of 10% of the plies in any one of the four principal directions (0, +45, -45, 90). 
C. Standardization of Finite Element Boundary Conditions 
Modeling only the structure of interest generally results in high loads being present in the vicinity of the model 
boundaries.  Subsequently, sizing analyses using these loads will yield overly conservative structures.  To avoid 
being overly conservative, additional element groups at the ends of the structure were included to represent the 
adjacent structure.  Attachment rings between major components were also included in the analysis to provide a 
representative stiffness. An example of the representative load introduction structures and boundary conditions used 
in the analysis is shown in Fig. 2.  
D. Material Properties 
Al-Li material properties were provided in Ref. 4.  IM7/8552 material values were provided by the Marshall 
Space Flight Center (MSFC) (Ref. 5), which included representative open-hole compression (OHC) values for this 
material system.  The use of OHC values in the analysis for the composites certainly yielded conservative results, 
but do allow for a more relaxed damage control plan than would be required for pristine material values. 
E. Factors of Safety 
Reference 6 was used to determine factors of safety applied to the different concept.  Specifically, ultimate and 
limit factors of safety of 1.4 and 1.25, respectively were applied to the metallic concept while 1.4 and 1.0 for 
ultimate and limit factors of safety, respectively were applied to the composite concept.  Additionally, a factor of 2.0 
was applied to discontinuities in the composite concept per Ref. 5. 
F. Loads 
Loads applied to the Interstage were provided by the Ares V Project Office as section component loads (axial 
force, shear force, bending moment) at each section along the length of the vehicle, for multiple load cases.  The 
maximum values for these forces along the length of the Interstage were applied to a rigid element attached to the 
top of the load introduction structure at the top of the model.  The translational degrees of freedom at the bottom of 
 
Figure 2. Interstage Finite Element Model 
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the model were constrained axially.  The lateral loads were applied to the model in multiple load cases at different 
angles with respect to the central axis because of the asymmetry in the model due to the cutouts. 
IV. Initial Sizing 
Hypersizer®
§§
 software was used to size the panels and beams that make up the Interstage.  The software allows 
the user to specify a wall concept type, materials, and possible geometric parameters for panels and beams.  Multiple 
failure calculations are then made given the loads applied to the components that make up a model.  Starting with 
the lightest permutation multiple failure criteria are checked.  If the component ‘fails’ these checks with negative 
margins of safety, the next permutation is evaluated until the lightest permutation that has positive margins of safety 
for all of the possible failure modes is found.  This process can then be iterated to determine any impact of load re-
distribution on the model. 
The metallic version of the Interstage generally benefits from the use of ring frames along the length to provide 
buckling stability.  A study was initially conducted to determine the optimum ring-frame spacing for the large 
acreage portions of the Interstage barrel.  A finite element representation of the Interstage was created and subjected 
to axial and lateral launch and ascent conditions.  Ring frames were then included at different spacing along the 
length of the Interstage.  The ring frames were sized using Shanley’s criteria2 to ensure a global buckling pattern 
with node lines at the ring frame locations.  The panels between the ring frames were then sized appropriately for the 
applied loads and local buckling constraints. The total mass for the Interstage was then calculated. 
 The results of the ring frame spacing analysis are shown in Fig. 3.  With no ring frames, the acreage skin mass is 
relatively high as the buckling length for the Interstage is very long.  By introducing ring frames and decreasing the 
ring frame spacing, the areal mass of the acreage skin decreases.  However, as more and more frames are introduced, 
the mass contribution from the ring frames increases to a point where the benefit of the increased stiffness from the 
ring frames is overcome by the ring frame mass impact.  As a result, there is an optimum frame spacing that yields 
minimum mass for this concept.  The sensitivity to ring frame spacing at the optimum frame spacing is relatively 
small since there is a relatively flat line in the total mass values as shown in Fig. 3.  The maximum frame spacing in 
this area of optimum mass was chosen knowing that the manufacturing cost will be less.  Analysis of the composite 
version of the Interstage showed that the addition of ring frames did not provide mass savings (ring frames were 
included at the ends, with more detail provided in the detailed analysis). 
V. Detailed Sizing Analysis 
While the initial sizing indicated a significant mass savings afforded by using composite materials (>40%), it 
was anticipated that some of these savings would be compromised when more detail was included in the model.  In 
particular, the higher factor of safety required for discontinuities was expected to increase the mass contribution at 
locations for penetrations required for ingress/egress and venting.  Additionally, the inclusion of metallic joints at 
the upper and lower interfaces on the composite Interstage will require build-ups that will increase the mass locally.  
Rather than relying on personal 
engineering judgment in these areas, an 
attempt was made to include all of 
these design details in the analysis for 
the two Interstage designs. 
A. Cutouts 
Human access to the components 
interior to the Interstage shell (during 
fabrication, integration, and potentially 
on the launch pad) necessitated the 
inclusion of two doors located at either 
end of the Interstage barrel.  The doors 
were sized following guidelines 
provided by operations personnel at the 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC).  
Additionally, two vent/purge lines were 
included in the model, also based on 
                                                          
§§
 This is not an endorsement by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
 
Figure 3. Optimum Ring Frame Spacing –  
Ares V Interstage Metallic Concept 
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the feedback from KSC personnel.  Those sections of the model immediately surrounding the penetrations were 
separated to allow appropriate sizing of the buildup area required for load redistribution while the penetrations were 
assumed to carry no load (a conservative assumption). The model with the access doors and vent/purge holes is 
shown in Fig. 2.  The resulting model was no longer axisymmetric with the inclusion of the penetrations.  Since the 
loads provided for sizing did not assume a vehicle attitude, multiple load cases were now needed to ensure 
maximum loading throughout the model.  The lateral shear force and bending moment were rotated around the 
central axis of the Interstage to force loading directly over the penetrations. 
Sizing the model with the modifications for cutouts yielded acreage panels that weighed 1.1 lb/ft
2
 and 2.0 lb/ft
2
 
for the composite and metallic concepts, respectively.  This yields total panel masses of 7722 lbm and 14,420 lbm 
for the composite and metallic concepts, respectively.  The beam masses for the metallic concept (3093 lbm) were 
significantly larger than the beam masses for the composite concept (336 lbm) because of the additional ring frames 
necessary for buckling stability (in the metallic design).  The total masses for the two concepts were 8232 lbm for 
the composite and 17,600 lbm for the metallic concept. 
Comparing the sizing results with the initial analysis results afforded some insight into the impact of the cutouts.  
The portal openings added approximately 87 lbm (each) for the composite concept, but only 45 lbm for the metallic 
design.  The vent/purge cutouts added only 16.8 lbm and 13.5 lbm for the composite and metallic concepts, 
respectively. 
B. Joint Details 
The Interstage attaches at the forward end to the EDS Intertank and the aft end of the Interstage attaches to the 
core stage section (see Fig. 1) at the forward end of the Instrument Unit.  Initial analysis of the Interstage did not 
consider these attachments.  However, the attachments and any additional buildup at these locations must be 
accounted for in any mass comparisons.  A general assumption was made that a flange type connection would be 
used for both the metallic and composite concepts.  However, implementation of this flange required much different 
design details for the two concept types. 
The metallic joint design is relatively simple since the flange can be welded directly to the acreage material 
using a friction stir weld.  The weld tool requires a two inch area of material on either side of the weld without 
stiffeners for this operation.  Mass estimates for the metallic Interstage concept were calculated assuming the cross-
section concept detail shown in Fig. 4.  The stiffeners were assumed to taper to a flat area two inches long.  This ring 
is then welded to the joint ring with another two inch flat section.  The flange then connects to the adjacent ring 
section with bolts, represented in Fig. 4 by dashed lines.  A detailed finite element model of this joint attachment 
ring is shown in Fig. 5 and is used to size thicknesses of the flange, flats, and webs appropriately (including a knock-
down factor on the material allowable properties of the weld material). 
The composite joint had additional complications when compared with the metallic joint.  The composite 
acreage panels were assumed to be closed out at the ends with higher density core material.  Additional plies were 
added in the area of the high density core to react bearing loads from the fasteners that attach the pocket of the joint 
to the composite panel.  The number of plies required was calculated by selecting a bolt diameter and calculating the 
bearing load on the facesheets (given the applied shear load).  By selecting a number of different bolt sizes, the 
sensitivity of the joint mass was evaluated.  The additional detail in the panel that was evaluated in the composite 
joint area is shown in Fig. 6. 
 
Figure 4. Metallic End-Ring Cross-Sectional Geometry Assumptions 
 
 
Figure 5. Detailed Metallic 
Joint Model 
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The end ring for the composite panels is shown in Fig. 7 
and consists of a flange, similar to the metallic joint concept, 
with a pocket that fits over the modified panel.  The geometry 
of the end ring was calculated given the bolt diameter and 
applied loads using a strength of materials approach. 
Five different bolt sizes were evaluated ranging in size 
from 0.25 in. to 0.5 in.  The results of the joint mass details are listed in Table 1.  The smallest bolt diameter yielded 
the minimum mass, but also required a large number of fasteners.  It was assumed that the large number of bolts 
would increase costs, so a compromise solution was also evaluated.  By increasing the pad-up thickness, fewer bolts 
could be used (without reaching the bearing strength of the facesheet plies) with an inherent mass penalty (~20% 
increased mass for the composite joint design). 
 
C. Secondary Loading Effects 
Previous experience has shown the need to consider any 
significant point loads, attachments, or secondary loads, 
particularly for composite concepts.  In order to capture any impact 
due to secondary thrust loads (ullage settling motors, reaction 
control system (RCS) firings, etc.) a detail model, shown in Fig. 8, 
was developed that allowed for the sizing of a cutout (and 
surrounding structure) due to these loads.  Thrust loads for ullage 
settling and RCS firing were difficult to determine given the early 
stage of design, so the thrust loads were assumed to be three times 
larger than those used for the Saturn S-IVB upper stage.  The panel 
section was then sized with and without the thrust loads to 
determine the impact of including this detail.  For the thrust level 
applied and the loads that sized the acreage panels, no mass 
increase was required to react the secondary loads. 
Structural 
Interface 
Design 
Pad-up 
Thickness 
(in) 
Number 
of 
Fasteners 
Pad-up 
Mass 
(lbm) 
Core 
Densification 
(lbm) 
Fastener 
Mass 
(lbm) 
Ring Mass 
(lbm) 
Total Mass 
(lbm) 
Composite 
Forward 
Flange 
Minimum 
Mass 
0.01 2294 4.8 73.7 76.6 413.9 569.9 
Compromise 0.08 1162 46 73.7 40.1 455.3 615.1 
Composite 
Aft Flange 
Minimum 
Mass 
0.01 3237 4.8 73.7 108.1 457 643.6 
Compromise 0.09 1374 53 73.7 47.6 507.5 681.8 
Metallic 
Forward 
or Aft 
 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 326.1 557 
 
Table 1: Interstage Joint Mass Details 
 
Figure 6. Detailed Composite Panel Buildup at Joints 
 
 
Figure 7. End-Ring Cross-Sectional Geometry 
for Composite Panels 
 
 
Figure 8. Detailed Thrust Effects Model 
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VI.  Cost Analysis 
The results of the detailed sizing analysis provided a baseline design to evaluate the costs associated with the 
anticipated lifecycle costs for these two manufacturing and fabrication methods, from development through 
production. NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) has been developing parametric cost modeling tools since 
1992.  These tools maximize the use of available definition information, leveraging historical design, analysis, and 
cost results.  The tools utilize descriptive, in-depth parameter sets at a common element level.  Additionally, the 
element level is selected at an appropriate point in the development or manufacturing process to faithfully reproduce 
the processes involved and remove analyst judgment as much as possible.  The results provide useful feedback 
regarding sensitivity trends to allow for ‘sanity check’ evaluation of results throughout the process. 
For evaluation of the Interstage geometry, the costs of individual parts, from development through fabrication, 
and assembly, were determined considering mechanical parameters, electrical parameters, and project unique 
parameters.  These costs were included in assembly level fabrication, final integration in system level operations, 
testing, and checkout operations.  Examples of the mechanical, electrical, and project unique parameters are shown 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Mechanical, Electrical, and Project Unique Parameters 
Mechanical Parameters Electrical Parameters Project Unique Parameters 
Quantity per assembly Quantity per assembly Engineering level 
Mass Component area Engineering difficulty 
Number parts Component or package pins New drawing fraction 
Unique fraction Component active elements Design, Fabrication multiplier (include or not) 
Average number instructions/part Unique fraction I&T Plans fraction 
Precision Component type I&T multiplier (include or not) 
Machinability index (Batelle scale) Package type Number prototype units, per phase 
Assembly difficulty Unit learning curve for fabrication Specification (platform) level, per phase 
Fraction hogout  Component boundary Test level, per phase 
Fraction yield loss Integration difficulty Multiplier, phase duration, per phase 
Surface finish Board type Fabrication unit fraction of overlap within phase 
Surface area Board layers Multiplier, resources, per phase 
Optics design complexity Total board mass Multiplier, resources, per function 
Unit learning curve for fabrication Volume Unit learning curve for fabrication, per phase 
Integration difficulty 
 
Unit learning curve for engineering, per phase 
Volume 
 
Schedule constraints 
 
 
Multiplier on staff level penalty  
  
Hours per labor month  
 
While NASA has conducted significant technology development to enable the production of a Heavy Lift 
Launch Vehicle (HLLV), the manufacturing development and production will likely take place at a prime contractor 
location.  As a result, it is necessary to have some insight into the industry manufacturing development and 
production costs.  Upfront design decisions will drive lifecycle costs, and the manufacturing development and 
production costs are needed to accurately model this impact.  NASA contracted with the Lockheed-Martin 
Corporation (Lockheed-Martin) and the Boeing Company (Boeing) to provide detailed cost models of generic 
Interstage designs focused specifically on composite fabrication methods.  Additionally, Boeing provided cost 
analysis information for the Ares I Interstage design (both metallic and composite concepts), another large 
cylindrical barrel design, as part of the Ares I Project. 
The cost analysis details provided by Lockheed-Martin and Boeing were used to verify and adjust the cost 
modeling software used at LaRC.  The results of the industry studies were duplicated using the LaRC cost parameter 
tools considering similar prototype definitions, development and production schedules, technology development, 
material characterization, manufacturing test demonstrations, system test demonstrations, and production costs.  No 
significant method modifications were required to reach similar cost estimates compared with the industry results.  
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In an attempt to further validate the tool, a meeting was held with representatives from the Marshall Space Flight 
Center (MSFC) who use the NASA/Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM) database.  The results determined using the 
LaRC parameter cost tools showed similar trends to those evaluated previously with NAFCOM.  Additionally, the 
extra scrutiny provided confidence that there were no significant costs left out of the evaluation or improperly 
estimated. 
A cost model for the Ares V Interstage was developed using the previously described tools.  The design details 
provided in Sections IV and V drove the cost model development. The cost model provided production costs, staff 
levels, and design, development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E) costs.  The annual development and production 
costs are shown in Fig. 9.  The cost model results in Fig 9 indicate that initial costs were significantly higher for the 
development of the composite concept.  However, the production costs for the composite concept (~$5M/unit) were 
dramatically lower than the manufacturing and fabrication costs for the metallic concept (~$8M/unit).  Boeing and 
Lockheed-Martin found similar trends in their evaluation of their composite and metallic concepts.  This trend was 
generally governed by lower part counts and decreased touch labor for the composite concept compared with the 
metallic concept.  This trend is an important consideration when determining the preferred manufacturing and 
fabrication techniques.   
The results from the cost analysis provided the information necessary to determine lifecycle costs for the 
Interstage, from a system perspective.  However, the mass differences seen between the metallic and composite 
concepts did not allow a consistent comparison between the two concepts.  At a system level, the capability of the 
launch vehicle would be impacted by the decision to use one or the other manufacturing and fabrication techniques 
because of the change in inserted mass to low-Earth orbit (IMLEO).  Flying a less capable vehicle will require 
additional flights in order to complete an assigned mission successfully.  An attempt was made to determine the 
impact of this effect at the system level by converting the difference in IMLEO to lifecycle costs.  First, changes in 
mass at the Interstage level do not correlate one-to-one with changes in IMLEO because the Interstage separates 
from the launch vehicle prior to orbit insertion.  To account for this, a gear ratio of 0.2 was utilized following 
trajectory analysis at the system level.  In essence, this implies that a one-pound change in the mass of the Interstage 
will result in a 0.2-pound change in the IMLEO.  Two flights per year were estimated as the flight manifest.  
 
Figure 9: Annual Development and Production Costs 
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Multiplying the Interstage mass difference, the gear ratio, and the flight rate together provides the difference in 
IMLEO per annum between a vehicle that uses a metallic Interstage and one that uses a composite Interstage. 
The remaining piece of information required to determine the cost impact of the IMLEO change is the cost to 
raise the mass difference to orbit, αLEO.  Such a cost is difficult to come by and is often used as an estimate of the 
capability of launch systems. The Futron Corporation attempted to evaluate this metric in 2002 for a number of 
different launch vehicles and orbits
7
.  The estimates for this value vary widely with different organization and 
different launch vehicle sizes.  The best estimate for the cost to launch a pound of payload to orbit from this study 
that would correlate with a HLLV is approximately $5000/lbm (inflation adjusted to year 2010 dollars).  Multiplying 
the IMLEO difference per year with this cost to orbit provides a system level estimate of the cost impact of the 
different Interstage concepts.  This cost is called the unrealized mass benefit (UMB). 
Adding the development and production costs over the life of the system with the UMB is shown in Fig. 10, 
significant cost savings can be realized with the composite version of the Interstage as conceived here.  Using the 
nominal costs for αLEO, approximately $172 million dollars are saved with the composite concept over the life of the 
system.  While the results are relatively sensitive to αLEO, the total cost savings are significant even with dramatic 
(and optimistic) changes to this value.  For a factor of 5 improvement in αLEO (to $1000/pound) over the state of the 
art, the composite concept still saves over $45 million dollars over the life of the system in the results shown in  Fig. 
10.. The slope change at the end plots in Fig. 10 is because there is only one unit manufactured in the final year. 
The lifecycle cost results show that the UMB is important when considering the system impact of mass changes 
in the design.  The design and analysis of the Interstage includes significant detail regarding design details that tend 
to increase mass in a composite design.  However, many people still approach composites with trepidation, 
particularly when considering mass estimates at an early stage in the design.  To evaluate the impact of differences 
in the design results, an additional composite design was considered that showed significantly smaller mass benefits 
compared with the metallic design.  These results are shown in Fig. 11.  While the baseline composite design 
weighed approximately 35% less than the metallic design, the second composite design was assumed to be a more 
modest 20% lighter than the metallic design.  The impact of this additional mass is seen in the UMB but does not 
alter the production cost per unit.  The baseline composite design yields approximately $172 million over the life of 
 
Figure 10: Total Lifecycle Costs – UMB Sensitivity 
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the system while the less capable composite design still yields over $104 million dollars in savings over the life of 
the system as shown in Fig. 11.  
Clearly, significant costs can be saved by utilizing composite structures as detailed here.  The Interstage structure 
analyzed is generally lightly loaded.  As a result, the capabilities of a composite concept are more suited to this 
structure and yield lower masses.  The cost analysis shows that the initial costs associated with the composite 
fabrication are significantly larger than those associated with the metallic concept.  However, the production costs 
for the composite concept are significantly lower compared with the metallic concept.  The implication is that for 
design solutions that only require a few units, it might not be cost effective to invest in the initial capital costs 
associated with composite concepts.  However, if several units are required for the system, the initial investments 
will be quickly recouped by savings in fabrication costs.  By considering the system level costs associated with the 
reduced capability of a system (UMB) that uses a heavier (metallic) Interstage, the differences are amplified. 
 
Figure 11: Total Lifecycle Costs – Composite Mass Sensitivity 
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VII. Summary 
Detailed design and analysis results revealed significant mass savings (~35%) for a composite Ares V Interstage 
concept as compared to a similarly designed metallic Interstage concept.  The detailed analysis of the initial 
development costs shows significant upfront costs for a composite concept that are not required for a metallic 
concept.  However, annual production costs for the composite concept are approximately 45% lower than the 
production costs of the metallic concept.  These production cost differences, coupled with the mass savings seen 
with a composite concept, correspond to significant cost savings over the life of the Interstage (>$100M over the life 
of the project), even given the additional technology development costs during the early stages of the project. 
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